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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1977, the English expressed interest in assimilating into the European 
Patent Convention (“EPC”).
1
  In order to facilitate entry into the EPC, England 
sought to bring its patent system in-line with the other countries in the EPC.
2
  
Unfortunately the English hurried in enacting a new law, and overlooked the fact 
that many of the provisions of the EPC were based on the German patent system, 
which was a central claim interpretation system.
3
  The English, with a peripheral 
claim interpretation system, lacked any recourse to limit patent claims that 
awarded patent rights broader than the accompanying disclosure.
4
  To this day, 
the English still have difficulty with these so-called “free beer” claims.
5
   
The recent reform enacted on September 16, 2011 fundamentally changed 
how the U.S. patent system addresses the disclosure requirement.
6
  The United 
States no longer has a means of policing patents that hide the best mode but 
otherwise adequately enable one skilled in the art of how to make and use the 
disclosed invention.  Twenty years from now, America’s equivalent to England’s 
“free beer” claim may involve hidden best mode fact patterns unless, as this 
article suggests, the U.S. either strengthens its enforcement of best mode through 
35 U.S.C. § 112 or inherits a central claim interpretation regime.
7
    
First, before analyzing how the new law got us into this mess, it is necessary 
to discuss the policy behind the patent system and have an adequate 
understanding of each disclosure requirement and their interrelatedness under the 
old law.
8
  This article follows with an examination of the effects of the Leahy-




  Next, in search of solutions, the 
U.K. patent system is analyzed for its response after it eliminated the best mode 
requirement.
11
  Drawing on the knowledge from the United Kingdom, this article 
                                                                                                                                     
1
 Dale L. Carlson, et. al, Patent Linchpin for the 21st Century? – Best Mode Revisited, 45 
IDEA 267, 285 (2005).  
2
 See Terje Gudmestad, Patent Law of the United States and the United Kingdom: A 
Comparison, 5 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 173, 176 (1982) (stating that “The purpose of 
the Act is threefold: (a) it codifies much of the prior British patent law; (b) it modernizes several 
areas of British patent law . . . ; and (c) it unifies patent law with that of other European 
countries.”) (footnotes omitted).  
3
 See 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 4.4 n.1 (4th ed. 2010).  
4
 See infra Part IV.  
5
 See 1 MOY, supra note 3, § 4.4 n.1.  
6
 See infra Part III. 
7
 See infra Part V.  
8
 See infra Part II. 
9
 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).  
10
 See infra Part III. 
11
 See infra Part IV.  
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argues that a stronger enforcement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 or a switch to a central 
claim interpretation are two legitimate ways of dealing with hidden best mode fact 
patterns under the AIA.
12
  Finally, this article concludes that some other 
mechanism must step in to take the place of best mode in order to avoid granting 
patents that offend the underlying principles of patent law.
13
  
II. BACKGROUND: OVERVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM AND DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS  
A. Purpose of the Patent System 
The rationale behind the intellectual property provision in the United States 
Constitution is based on the idea of promoting “the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
14
  Ever since the first patent statute 
was enacted in 1790, Congress and the public have wrestled with the cost-benefit 
analysis associated with granting a patent.
15
  The social costs of issuing a patent 
involve negative effects on competition through single-source price control
16
 and 
decreased rate of future inventive activity.
17
  On the other hand, patent law seeks 
to promote progress by ensuring that the patent right issued to protect the 
inventor’s invention “is commensurate with what the inventor discloses to the 
public,” a quid pro quo exchange of patent rights for disclosure.
18
  Such “adequate 
disclosure” encourages invention because “the expectation that patent rights will 
be available causes inventions to be sought after more vigorously.”
19
  The other 
social benefit most often discussed is the increased incentive to innovate.
20
   
                                                                                                                                     
12
 See infra Part V.  
13
 See infra Part VI.  
14
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
15
 See MOY, supra note 3, § 1:26–42.  
16
 See id. § 1:31–33 (stating that a supplier with single-source price control will drive up price 
by decreasing supply); see also Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent 
Law, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 407 (2010) (explaining that “[d]eadweight loss, allocative 
inefficiency, and wealth transfer from consumers to the [patentees]” are potential consequences of 
the current system where only a single supplier exists). 
17
 See MOY, supra note 3, § 1:31.  The efforts to discover new technology are hindered by the 
newly patented technology, because after discovery the technology becomes “legally unusable” 
and “actually decreases the incentive to invent within the controlled field.”  Id. § 1:34.  
18
 Krista Stone, Written Description After Ariad v. Eli Lilly: 35 USC § 112’s Third Wheel, 11 J. 
HIGH TECH. L. 191, 222 (2010); see MOY, supra note 3, § 1:37.  
19
 MOY, supra note 3, § 1:38.  This is important because patenting leads to follow-on 
innovation, which “accounts for the vast majority of technological breakthroughs.”  Devlin, supra 
note 16, at 408.  
20
 MOY, supra note 3, § 1:40 (stating that incentive to “invent” is different from incentive to 
“innovate” where innovation involves commencement of commercialization). 
4
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In general, society has determined that the benefits of awarding patents exceed 
the costs and therefore encourage patenting of inventions.  Although the quid pro 
quo idea is easy to grasp, there is incentive—for example, the clear and 
convincing proof standard for proving invalidity
21
—for patentees to do whatever 
it takes to get a patent.
22
  This attitude undermines the policy justifications of the 
patent system.  
B. Elements and Mechanisms of Adequate Disclosure 
The patent system uses 35 U.S.C. § 112 to lay out three disclosure 
requirements that require inventors to disclose certain information about the 
invention in order to be eligible for the quid pro quo exchange:
23
 
The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in 
such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person 
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most 
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the 




The three disclosure requirements include an adequate written description, an 
enablement, and a best mode requirement.
25
  These three requirements work in 
unison to ensure that the inventor fulfills his obligations during patent 
prosecution.
26
  The required disclosure in the specification works in concert with 
the information contained in the claims to promote the ultimate disclosure: the 
scope of the claimed invention.
27
  To identify the scope of the claimed invention, 
it is necessary to study each disclosure requirement individually, how the three 
requirements interrelate, and how these requirements interact with claim 
interpretation. 
                                                                                                                                     
21
 E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
22
 Sivaramjani Thambisetty, Patents as Credence Goods, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 707, 
714–15 (2007) (finding that revoking the patent and challenging validity gives incentive to 
patentee to do whatever one needed to do to get a patent).  
23
 See 2 MOY, supra note 3, § 7:1.  
24
 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).  
25
 See generally Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(affirming the presence of a written description requirement separate from the enablement 
requirement); Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that 
“[t]he best mode requirement is ‘separate and distinct’ from enablement . . . .”) (citing In re Gay, 
309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962)).   
26
 See 2 MOY, supra note 23, § 7:1. 
27
 See Devlin, supra note 16, at 409–10.  
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1. Written Description Requirement 
Paragraph 1 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 states “[t]he specification shall contain a 
written description of the invention . . . .”
28
  The purpose of the written 
description requirement is to ensure that the inventor discloses enough details of 
the invention so that subsequent inventors can improve and build upon the 
patent’s teachings and to ensure that the inventor “was in full possession” of the 
claimed invention on the day of filing.
29
   
As the patent system evolved and new patent statutes were introduced, the 
rationale for applying the written description evolved.
30
  The written description 
requirement inherited a much larger role in invalidating patents after its 
application in Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.
31
 where it 
invalidated a patent for failing to meet the written description requirement.  One 
commentator claimed that this created a “super-enablement” requirement and 
feared that this would limit a patent “only to those embodiments disclosed” and 
create rights that are narrow and easily invented around.
32
  
Much debate has centered on whether or not this is a separate disclosure 
requirement.  In 2010, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) 
issued its latest ruling on the matter confirming the existence of a separate written 
description requirement.
33
  The court has applied written description in two 
contexts since its en banc ruling in Ariad.
34
 
                                                                                                                                     
28
 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2011).  
29
 See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.04 (2011).  
30
 See In re Baker 559 F.2d 588 (C.C.P.A. 1977).  The written description requirement can be 
traced back to early Supreme Court cases where its primary purpose was public notice.  See Evans 
v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).    
31
 119 F.3d 1559, 1562.  Because Eli Lilly disclosed only the chemical’s function rather than 
its structure, the court invalidated the patent for failing to meet the written description 
requirement.  Id. at 1568.    
32
 See Stone, supra note 18, at 201.  Limiting patent rights “only to those embodiments 
disclosed” rather than to what is stated in the claims necessitates a mention of the central claim 
interpretation upon which this rationale is based.  
33
 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).  The 
Ariad case pitted Judge Lourie—defender of written description—against Judge Rader, a fierce 
opponent of the written description.  Id.  Ultimately, Judge Lourie’s camp won out, deciding in 
favor of a separate written description requirement.  See also Jacob Adam Schroeder, Written 
Description: Protecting the Quid Pro Quo Since 1793, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 63, 84–88 (2010). 
34
 Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (deciding the 
first case since the court’s decision in Ariad).  Despite choosing not to strictly adhere to Judge 
Newman’s reasoning in Ariad, the court still found invalidity on grounds of failure to meet the 
written description.  The court relied primarily on the disclosure-for-monopoly rationale. 
6
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2. Enablement Requirement 
Paragraph 1 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 states that the written description of the 
invention must be “in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any 
person skill in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same . . . .”
35
  An assessment of enablement 
requires an examination into whether “everything within the scope of the claim is 
enabled.”
36
  This examination is required because the “level of disclosure 
necessary to satisfy section 112 of title 35 varies according to the scope of the 
claimed invention.”
37
   
The rationale behind the enablement requirement involves ensuring a 
disclosure of the invention sufficient to give interested persons possession of the 
invention.
38
  Courts enforce the requirement that a specification “must teach those 
skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention 
without ‘undue experimentation.’”
39
  In In re Wands, the CAFC established 
factors to be considered in determining whether undue experimentation is needed 
to practice the invention.
40
 
                                                                                                                                     
35
 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).  
36
 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, , U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, MPEP § 2164.08 (8
th
 ed., 
rev. 8, July 2010) [hereinafter MPEP] (“The focus of the examination inquiry is whether 
everything within the scope of the claim is enabled. Accordingly, the first analytical step requires 
that the examiner determine exactly what subject matter is encompassed by the claims.”).  
37
 CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Title 35 requires 
only that the inventor enable one of skill in the art to make and use the full scope of the claimed 
invention.” (citing Durel Corp v. Osram Sylvania Inc, 256 F.3d 1298, 1306–07 (Fed. Cir. 2001); 
In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 
1988))).   
38
 2 MOY, supra note 23, § 7.2.  See also Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 219 (1832) 
(explaining that a patent specification and description “is necessary in order to give the public, 
after the privilege shall expire, the advantage for which the privilege is allowed”).  
39
In re Wright, 999 F.2d at 1561 (citing In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re 
Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736–37 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).  
The court in In re Wright went on to say that “[n]othing more than objective enablement is 
required, and therefore it is irrelevant whether this teaching is provided through broad terminology 
or illustrative examples.”  Id. (citing In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971)). 
40
 See In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. The factors include: 
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or 
guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the 
nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those 
in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth 
of the claims.  
Id. (citing In re Forman 230 U.S.P.Q. 546, 547 (1986)). 
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3. Best Mode Requirement  
Paragraph 1 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 states that the disclosure “shall set forth the 
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”
41
  The 
primary purpose of this requirement is to prevent inventors from withholding 
trade secrets that give them a competitive advantage while simultaneously 
securing patent rights on a different embodiment of the invention.
42
   
In order to conduct a best mode inquiry, the definition of the invention must 
be derived from the scope of the claims.
43
 Consequently, the CAFC applies a two 
prong test to determine whether the inventor complied with the best mode 
requirement.
44
  The first prong is a subjective inquiry into the inventor’s state of 
mind at the time of filing to determine whether the inventor possessed a best 
mode for practicing the invention.
45
  Second, an objective inquiry focused on the 
scope of the claimed invention and the skill level in the art is used to determine 
whether the written description discloses the best mode such that one reasonably 
skilled in the art could practice the invention.
46
  
In Bayer AG v. Schein Pharmaceuticals, the CAFC applied the modern best 
mode requirement.
47
 The court identifies three scenarios where the scope of the 
disclosure fails to meet the best mode requirement: the best mode disclosure 
requirement only refers to the invention defined by the claims,
48
 the failure to 
                                                                                                                                     
41
 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).   
42
 See In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (1962) (reversing the USPTO decision and siding with the 
inventor because there was no reason for holding that appellant withheld best mode).  
43
 N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286–87 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing 
Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). This is an important 
point because claim interpretation strategy will decide the definition of the invention upon which 
the best mode inquiry will take place.  See id at 1286–87.  “Once the invention has been defined 
by examining the claim, the finder of fact . . . can proceed to determine whether the inventor 
subjectively possessed a best mode of practicing the claimed invention.”  Accord Bayer AG v. 
Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
44
 See N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1286 (“The first inquiry is whether, at the time of filing the 
patent application, the inventor considered a particular mode of practicing his invention superior to 
all other modes. This inquiry is wholly subjective; that is, it focuses on the inventor's state of mind 
at the time he filed his patent application. The second inquiry is whether the inventor's disclosure 
is adequate to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the best mode of the invention. 
This inquiry is objective and depends upon the scope of the claimed invention and the level of 
skill in the relevant art.”) (citation omitted); see also MPEP, supra note 36, § 2165.03. 
45
 N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1286; see also MPEP, supra note 36, § 2165.03. 
46
 N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1286. 
47
 Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Section 112 only 
demands disclosure of ‘the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his 
invention.’” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112)). 
48
 See Bayer AG, 301 F.3d at 1315; see also In re Brebner, 455 F.2d 1402 (C.C.P.A. 1972) 
(stating that best mode is limited to the invention as defined in the claims).  
8
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disclose a preferred embodiment,
49





 the invention.  Commentary highlights two 
important problems with the current enforcement of best mode.
52
  First, as stated 
by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interference, there is no requirement that the 
applicant point out which mode is the “best.”
53
  Further, the applicant is not 
required to update the best mode during prosecution
54
 even though the applicant is 
required to amend claims.  Because the best mode inquiry is of the inventor’s 
mind at the time of filing, any best mode at the time of filing may no longer be the 
best mode at the time the patent issues.  With no requirement to update during 
prosecution, enforcement of best mode is limited.  This is a point often restated by 
opponents of the best mode requirement.  Despite its limitations, the best mode 
requirement is an integral part of the overall disclosure requirement.  
4. Application and Interrelatedness of Disclosure Requirements and 
Importance of Claim Interpretation 
a. Disclosure Requirements 
With the enactment of the AIA the best mode requirement was eliminated as a 
means of defense in patent infringement cases.
55
  It is critical to understand the 
context in which a patent is invalidated under 35 U.S.C. § 282(3),
56
 because 
invalidity is possible when only one of the § 112 requirements is missing.
57
   
                                                                                                                                     
49
 See Bayer AG, 301 F.3d at 1316–17; U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209 
(Fed. Cir. 1996); Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923 (Fed. Cir. 1990); N. 
Telecom, Inc., v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  
50
 See Spectra-Physics, Inc., v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating 
that the failure to disclose the actual method of brazing preferred by the inventor rendered the 
patent claims invalid for failure to meet the best mode).  
51
 See Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. P’ship, 860 F.2d 415, 419–420 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that the 
failure to disclose the fluoride treatment of valve seals had a material effect on the properties of 
the claimed invention and was grounds for invalidity of the patent claim for failure to disclose the 
best mode of carrying out the invention).  
52
  See generally Wesley D. Markham, Is Best Mode the Worst? Dueling Arguments, Empirical 
Analysis, and Recommendations for Reform, 51 IDEA 129 (2011).  
53
 E.g. Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 589 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that “there 
is no requirement in 35 U.S.C. 112 that an applicant point out which of his embodiments he 
considers his best mode; that the disclosure includes the best mode contemplated by the applicant 
is enough to satisfy the statute.”).  The court used the reasoning of the Board of Patent Appeals 
and Interferences to decide that the statutory requirement for best mode was satisfied. Id.  
54
 See Markham, supra note 52, at 138–39 (citing KIMBERLY A. MOORE ET. AL, PATENT 
LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 570 (West 3rd ed. 2008)).  
55
 See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
56
 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2011).  The language of the statute, pre-AIA, states that: “The following 
shall be defenses in any action involving the validity of infringement of a patent and shall be 
9
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As identified in Bayer, there are only three scenarios susceptible to best mode 
invalidity.
58
  In each situation, each disclosure requirement plays a unique role.  
After studying these roles, it is apparent that although the disclosure requirements 
are interchangeable, in some instances best mode acts as the only means for 
invalidation in certain situations.  Therefore, in order to develop a plan on how to 
adjudicate hidden best mode fact patterns in the future, it is important to 
understand how the requirements relate to each other and under what 
circumstances the requirements are interchangeable when used as affirmative 
defenses.  
The establishment of a separate written description requirement allows courts 
to tackle a specific type of specification where there is enablement but not a 
written description.
59
  A separate best mode requirement allows courts to address 
situations where a patent is valid under both written description and enablement 
but invalid under best mode.
60
  The importance of a separate best mode 
requirement is explained as follows: 
Although some have suggested that disclosure solely sufficient to 
provide “enablement” of the invention should be adequate to 
protect society's interests, from a practical standpoint this is not, 
and cannot be, the case.  Best mode and enablement requirements 
are predicated on different policies and are designed to achieve 
different, albeit complementary, goals. While the enablement 
                                                                                                             
pleaded: . . . (3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with any 
requirement of section 112 . . . .”  Id. 
57
 “[F]or failure to comply with any requirement of section 112” signifies that absence of any 
one of the disclosure requirements may result in invalidation.  See id. (emphasis added).  
58
 See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text.  
59
 Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description” 
Requirement (And Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 55, 66–67 
(2000). Janis uses Judge’s Rich analysis from a non-precedential opinion to outline why it is 
important to have a separate written description requirement:  
Although a specification that meets the written description requirement 
always satisfies the enablement requirement, the converse is not always true. 
The written description must “enable any person skilled in the art to which it 
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use” the 
claimed invention. A patent specification, however, may fortuitously enable 
those of skill in the art to make and use an invention that an applicant did not 
make before filing the patent application. This latter application would satisfy 
the enablement requirement, but would not provide a section 112, first 
paragraph, “written description” adequate to support claims directed toward the 
later-made invention. 
Id. (citing In re Hunter, 1995 WL 36475 at *5 (citations omitted)). 
60
 See Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Janis, supra 
note 59, at 66–67.  
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requirement circumscribes a modicum of disclosure, that 
disclosure need only be sufficiently detailed to allow those skilled 
in the relevant art, without undue experimentation, to make and use 
the invention.  Indeed, no working example is required, and an 
example based merely on hypothesized results may suffice.
61
 
Best mode is additionally important in its capacity as a means of showing 
invalidity, because, as the USPTO has admitted in the MPEP, the patent 
examiners cannot know the best mode unless the inventors disclose it.
62
  Thus, 
most often the only way to discover a hidden best mode is during discovery in a 
litigation setting.
63
  As such, patent applications that would be invalid based only 
on a failure to disclose best mode raise the possibility that invalid patents will 
issue and remain free from a finding of invalidity:   
[E]nablement is a less-than-stringent requirement.  Disclosing any 
mode of carrying out the invention evidences compliance with 
enablement, even a mode that the inventor knows to be inadequate 
in the marketplace.  This puts any competitor seeking to enter the 
market upon expiration of the patent at a huge competitive 




b. Claim Interpretation 
Claim interpretation is a necessary part of evaluating disclosure requirements 
because the scope of a patent right depends upon the scope of the technological 
description.
65
  The best mode inquiry is dependent upon the definition of the 
invention as outlined by the claims:
66
   
                                                                                                                                     
61
 Carlson, supra note 1, at 272 (footnote omitted).  A separate best mode requirement is 
essential because it requires a subjective inquiry where the other inquiries are objective. See 
Spectra-Physics v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  This demands that the 
specification meet two separate and different inquiries thereby creating a whole other level of 
scrutiny.  This “other level of scrutiny” is often cited by anti-best mode proponents as a reason for 
getting rid of the requirement.   
62
 MPEP, supra note 36, § 2165.03; see also Markham, supra note 52, at 148.  
63
 See generally Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 926–928 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(stating that the appropriate inquiry is whether the inventor disclosed the best mode contemplated 
by him, a determination that cannot be made solely on the basis of the prior art).  
64
 Carlson, supra note 1, at 272. 
65
 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2011) (Paragraph two states that “[t]he specification shall conclude 
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which 
the applicant regards as his invention.”); see also Omega Eng’g, Inc., v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 
1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that “the definiteness requirement of the Patent Act” requires 
11
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Definition of the invention “is a legal exercise, wherein the 
ordinary principles of claim construction apply.” Defining the 
invention by analyzing the claim language is a crucial predicate to 
the factual portions of the best mode inquiry because it ensures that 
the finder of fact looks only for preferences pertaining to carrying 
out the claimed invention.
67
  
In other words, the method of claim interpretation necessarily influences the 
outcome of a best mode analysis.   
 Two competing theories are employed in the claim interpretation process: 
peripheral and central.
68
  Each strategy utilizes different tools and resources to 
determine the scope of the claim with each strategy typically producing a different 
result.  
i. Peripheral Claim Interpretation  
The United States uses a peripheral claim interpretation strategy.
69
  This 
strategy assigns a patent right based on the technological scope of the inherent, 
lingual definition of the language contained within the claim.
70
  Essentially, each 
term is given its “ordinary meaning” as understood by one of ordinary skill in the 
art.
71
  The potential problem is that the final interpretation could cover all the 
variations that are included in “the lingual definition of the generic term, 
including those beyond the embodiment illustrated.”
72
  Thus, generic claim 
language and purposely overbroad patent claims threaten to disrupt the quid pro 
quo policy justification of the patent system.  
The disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 have evolved to specifically 
enforce the quid pro quo exchange.
73
  The U.S. patent system utilizes other 
                                                                                                             
a specification that distinctly claims the subject matter regarded as the invention).  See generally 1 
MOY, supra note 3, § 4:1.  
66
 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  
67
 Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) 
(citing N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286–87 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  
68
 See 1 MOY, supra note 3, § 4:8.  
69
 Id.  
70
 Id.  This strategy depends on treating each word as a linguistic unit and assigning to each a 
correct definition.  Id.   
71
 See id.; Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles and Rules for 
Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 829, 841 (2005) (“The default 
rule is, according to the Federal Circuit, a word’s ‘ordinary meaning’: ‘As a starting point, we give 
claim terms their ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the 
art.’”).   
72
 See 1 MOY, supra note 3, § 4.8  
73
 Id. § 4.1 n.8 (citing In re Fischer, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).   
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doctrines to lessen the effects of interpreting claims peripherally, none of which 
will be discussed in this article.
74
 
ii. Central Claim Interpretation 
The other predominant claim interpretation strategy, central claiming, focuses 
on the disclosed embodiments when determining the scope of the patent right.
75
  
The analysis begins by separating out the technological disclosure from the 
background information.
76
  The technological disclosure is then parsed for 
disclosure of specific forms of inventive embodiments and the patent right 
assigned covers those embodiments.
77
  Thus, patent rights are limited to what is 
actually disclosed.  This reduces the likelihood of awarding patent rights that are 
not in concert with the quid pro quo exchange.  This system is primarily in use 
internationally.
78
   
The fundamental differences between a central claim interpretation system 
versus a peripheral claim interpretation system allow the former to adopt or 
abandon certain rules and regulations that are essential to the latter system.
79
  That 
is, the AIA “abandoned” the best mode requirement as an infringement defense,
80
 
which present problems with post-grant enforcement.  Without such a mechanism 
to keep the patentee honest, there is no way of policing post-grant enforcement of 
best mode: an essential element of the quid pro quo exchange.  Unfortunately, this 
scenario is now a reality.  
                                                                                                                                     
74
 1 MOY, supra note 3, § 4.1 n.8 (citing the doctrine of equivalents and the adequate scope of 
disclosure as two methods normally associated with reigning in overly broad patent rights 
resulting from peripheral claiming).  In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 
U.S. 17, 40–41 (1997), the Supreme Court used the doctrine of equivalents—an inquiry into how 
substitute elements match the function, way and result of the claim element or whether substitute 
elements play a role substantially different from claimed element—to decide that the infringing 
invention did not fall within the literal scope of the patent claim but its equivalency still implied 
infringement. See also Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 
1948).  
75
 See 1 MOY, supra note 3, § 4:8. 
76
 Id.  
77
 Id.  
78
 Id.  
79
 See Thomas K. McBride, Jr., Patent Practice in London – Local Internationalism: How 
Patent Law Magnifies the Relationship of the United Kingdom with Europe, the United States and 
the Rest of the World, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 31, 41–42 (2004–2005) (discussing the 
Epilady cases where an infringement suit was brought in several European countries including 
England, a peripheral claim interpretation system, and Germany, a central claiming interpretation 
system, had decidedly different outcomes that were based in part on the different claim 
interpretation systems and partly on the absence of rules and regulations in the U.K.).  
80
 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub L. No. 112–29, § 15, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).  
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III. PRA 2011: WHAT CHANGED?  HOW WILL IT INFLUENCE THE PATENT 
SYSTEM GOING FORWARD? 
Now that the pressure to reform the patent act has given way to the AIA,
81
 it is 
important to consider what actually changed.  Furthermore, it is important to 
analyze how the desire to harmonize the U.S. patent system with the international 
patent systems will affect the public policy underpinnings of the U.S patent 
system.  The AIA institutes a variety of changes; this paper will focus on the 
AIA’s elimination of the best mode requirement as an infringement defense 
mechanism.
82
  Before diving into an analysis of the change, it is important to 
consider the current state of best mode application
83
 and the debate regarding the 
removal of the best mode. 
It is almost impossible to describe best mode’s economic impact when 
comparing deterrence with increased litigation costs.
84
  However, contingents on 
both sides have arguments in their favor.  
A. Arguments For and Against the Elimination of Best Mode 
The argument in favor of keeping best mode is based on enhancing disclosure 
and innovation and minimizing strategic behavior by patentees.
85
  Essentially, 
both aspects of the argument focus on keeping the patent system in line with its 
founding principles.  The best mode prevents companies from obtaining a patent 
right while simultaneously failing to disclose the best mode in order to retain a 
trade secret.
86
  Prior to the AIA, inventors who failed to disclose best mode could 
face a losing battle in an infringement case where the infringer used best mode as 
a defense to infringement.
87
  In general, the current best mode doctrine 
encourages disclosure—a founding principle of U.S. patent law—and discourages 
strategic behavior by patentees by posing a continuous threat of invalidation.  
                                                                                                                                     
81
 Id.   
82
 Id.   
83
 See supra notes 41–54 and accompanying text.   
84
 Best mode’s economic and societal impact is best explained by:  
[T]he existence of the requirement has a prophylactic effect. That effect insures 
that most inventors will comply with the requirement; at least most of those who 
are properly informed of the downside risk associated with noncompliance. A 
focus on the limited number of times that patents have been invalidated by the 
CAFC for a best mode violation risks underestimating the value of this 
prophylactic impact. 
Carlson, supra note 1, at 280.  
85
 See Markham, supra note 52, at 145.  
86
 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
87
 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(3) (2006).  
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The entities arguing against best mode are made up of mainly those interested 
in protecting corporate interests.
88
  Their argument is based on three parts.  First, 
the best mode defense involves the state of the inventor’s mind, whose proof 
depends on circumstantial evidence.
89
  Thus, the parties contend, litigating best 
mode can be expensive and time consuming because it is based off the subjective 
state of the inventors mind at the time of filing.
90
  Second, the “best mode is 
useless” because there is no obligation to update the best mode.
91
  Thus, adequate 
disclosure is just as likely without best mode because current doctrine provides so 
little incentive to disclose.
92
  Third, because best mode has no counterpart in other 
major patent systems, “a special hardship” is placed on foreign inventors seeking 
U.S. patent protection.
93
  The authors of AIA essentially accepted these arguments 
and removed best mode from § 282(3).  
B. The Changes Adopted by PRA 2011 





 session—with no luck.  Oddly, AIA 2011, as 
championed by Senators Leahy and Smith, navigated its way through political 
gridlock and found its way to President Obama’s desk.  The language within the 





 post-grant review proceedings,
96
 preissuance 




 and best mode.
99
 
                                                                                                                                     
88
 See Markham, supra note 52, at 139–41.  
89
 Id. at 142.  
90
  See id.  See generally Donald S. Chisum, Best Mode Concealment and Inequitable Conduct 
in Patent Procurement: A Nutshell, A Review of Recent Federal Circuit Cases and a Plea for 
Modest Reform, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 277, 279–80 (1997).  
91
 See Markham, supra note 52, at 143; Transco Prods. Inc., v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 
38 F.3d 551, 558 (Fed. Cir. 1994), (finding that the district court erred in holding that the applicant 
must update the best mode disclosure).  
92
 Elimination of best mode will not enhance disclosure; it may have little to no effect.  See 
Markham, supra note 52, at 143. If full disclosure is the primary objective, Congress should 
strengthen the best mode requirement so that it improves the quality of disclosure, not eliminate it.  
See id. at 156–60.   
93
 See id. at 143–44; Chisum, supra note 90, at 279.  But see Markham, supra note 52, at 144 
(stating that at least 24 countries including Japan have some form of best mode built into their 
patent systems).  
94
 See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat 284 
(2011); Eric E. Bensen, Emerging Issues Analysis: Eric E. Bensen on the Patent Reform Act of 
2011, 2011 EMERGING ISSUES 5673 (2011).   
95
 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat 284 (2011).  
96
 Id. § 6.  
97
 Id. § 8.  
98
 Id. § 12.  
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1. Changes to 35 U.S.C. Section 282  
This article focuses on the elimination of the best mode requirement.
100
  For a 
more thorough accounting of changes to 35 U.S.C. § 282, consult the bill in its 
entirety.
101
  As it relates to the best mode requirement, the language of § 15 of 
AIA states the following:  
(a) In General.—Section 282 of title 35, United States Code, is 
amended in the second undesignated paragraph by striking 
paragraph (3) and inserting the following:  
“(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for 
failure to comply with— 
“(A) any requirement of section 112, except that the failure 
to disclose the best mode shall not be a basis on which any 
claim of a patent may be canceled or held invalid or 
otherwise unenforceable; or  
(B) any requirement of section 251.”. 
(b) Conforming Amendment.—Sections 119(e)(1) and 120 
of title 35 United States Code, are each amended by 
striking “the first paragraph of section 112 of this title” and 
inserting ‘section 112(a) (other than the requirement to 
disclose best mode)”.  
(c)Effective Date.—The amendments made by this section 
shall take effect upon the date of the enactment of this Act 




As stated, this provision removes best mode as an invalidity defense from § 
282(3) while retaining it in § 112, paragraph 1.
103
   
2. AIA Section 15’s Impact    
Because of the new law, a predictable series of events is likely to occur.  First, 
the inventor has little incentive to disclose a best mode and will not do so, because 
                                                                                                             
99
 Id. § 15.  
100
 Id.  
101
 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat 284 (2011).  
102
 See id. § 15.   
103
 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.  
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there is no threat of invalidity for failing to do so.
104
  Second, without best mode 
as a form of invalidity in litigation, it appears that there is little basis for 
requesting discovery directed thereto.
105
  Therefore, there is “no practical way of 
ever determining whether the best mode requirement had been satisfied with 
respect to a particular patent.”
106
  Problematically, this leads to patents that no 
longer face the threat of invalidation because they meet the written description 
requirement and enablement requirement but fail to disclose the best mode.
107
  
Furthermore, empirical studies have shown that best mode is typically used as an 
invalidity mechanism rather than a statutory bar to patentability.
108
  Thus, 
retaining its use as a statutory bar appears futile.  
3. Impact of Other Provisions in the AIA 
To exacerbate the problem, the AIA contains other provisions that also relax 
the disclosure requirement.
109
  With a switch to a first-to-file system it is widely 
believed a rush to secure priority will compromise the quality of disclosure.
110
  In 
the context of such a switch, it is in the best interest of the patent system to work 
to maintain adequate disclosure requirements so that society is not shortchanged 
on its part of the quid pro quo exchange.  Furthermore, § 5 of the AIA creates a 
prior use defense that encourages companies to second guess their 
commercialization strategies.
111
 This will likely drive the companies toward 
secrecy as a means to avoid commercial use as a possible infringement defense.
112
  
                                                                                                                                     
104
 Eric E. Bensen, Emerging Issues Analysis: Eric E. Bensen on the America Invents Act, 2011 
EMERGING ISSUES 5900 (2011). 
105
 Id.  
106
 Id.  
107
 See Carlson, supra note 1 at 272.  See also supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
108
 See Markham, supra note 52, at 150–51.  
109
 See supra note 95 and accompanying text; FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP 
MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 1 (2011) 
[hereinafter FTP IP MARKETPLACE] (“Invalid or overbroad patents disrupt that balance by 
discouraging follow-on innovation, preventing competition, and raising prices through 
unnecessary licensing and litigation.”).  
110
 See Jason Rantanen, The Effects of the America Invents Act on Technological Disclosure, 
PATENTLY-O (Sept. 8, 2011, 3:01 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/the-effects-of-
the-america-invents-act-on-technological-disclosure.html. 
111
 How the creation of a prior user defense pushes toward less disclosure can be explained by 
the following:  
 The types of inventions that the prior user defense most applies to are those 
with the capability of being protected through secrecy.  A prior user defense is 
less important for inventions whose workings are readily understandable once 
they are placed on the market because these products already represent 
potentially invalidating prior art; thus, this type of defense has most relevance 
for non-self disclosing inventions, a category that includes many processes.  
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To better grasp the problem, picture the Patent Act as a filter that removes all 
patents unworthy of patenting.  A single breach in the filter will reduce the filter’s 
effectiveness but will not undermine the entire filtering process if the breach can 
be repaired.
113
  The AIA introduces a breach into the patent act filter via the 
removal of best mode from § 282.  Patents that hide best mode while 
simultaneously securing patent rights on a separate embodiment are normally un-
patentable and are collected by the filter.
114
  However, as a result of the breach in 
the filter, those patents are now able to pass through the filter and are patentable.  
Unfortunately, the filter appears unfixable under new AIA disclosure doctrine.  In 
search of a solution, this article explores the U.K. patent system, which just so 
happened to abolish its best mode requirement in a similar context.
115
  
IV. U.K. DISCLOSURE IN THE ABSENCE OF BEST MODE 
In order to find what insights the English system might have, it is necessary to 
engage in a quick but detailed discussion on the background of the U.K. system, 
the 1977 reform, and current enforcement of disclosure requirements.  
A. Background of U.K. Patent System Pre-Reform 
 The underlying theory of the U.K. patent system is similar to the U.S. 
patent system in that the state “grants the inventor an exclusive monopoly for a 
limited time in his new invention in return for his disclosure of the invention so 
that the public at large will be able to practise the invention once the patent 
expires.”
116
   
                                                                                                             
Under the current law, inventors who develop non-self disclosing inventions are 
faced with a difficult choice: maintain the process as a trade secret, and run the 
risk of being blocked later by an inventor who obtains a patent, or file for a 
patent and disclose the process to the public.  Both options have significant costs 
associated with their selection but the patent and disclose option is hardly 
foreclosed. 
 A prior user defense reweights this decision in favor of maintaining secrecy 
because it reduces the risk of being blocked by a later inventor.  The directional 
effect of this change is to reduce the number of patents that are filed on secret 
inventions, and thus reduce the number of mandatory disclosures that 
accompany those patents. 
Id. 
112
 See id.  The entry goes on to discuss how the changes to new novelty rules that change what 
counts as prior art may result in a rush to early disclosure in an effort to “stymie their 
competitors.”  Id. 
113
 Repair in this context deals with finding another mechanism to act in best mode’s place to 
filter out un-patentable inventions.  
114
 See In Re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962).  
115
 See infra part IV.  
116
 BRIAN C. REID, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PATENT LAW 2 (2d ed. 1993).  
18
Cybaris®, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol3/iss1/5
[3:104 2012] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 122 
 
 Prior to 1977, the U.K. system was predominately concerned with 
addressing two fundamental issues.  Is the patentee bound by good faith to 
disclose the best mode?
117
  How does the relationship between the breadth of the 
claims and the disclosure in the specification determine the scope of the patent 
grant?
118
  The Patents Act of 1949 required the specification to contain sufficient 
and fair disclosure, utility, and disclosure of the best mode.
119
  “The requirement 
of sufficiency under U.K. patent law essentially parallels the U.S. requirements of 
enablement, written description, and best mode.”
120
  A “sufficient” disclosure 
containing all three elements in the specification would then serve as the basis for 
drafting and interpreting the claims.
121
  Because the U.K. is a peripheral claim 
interpretation regime,
122
 the claims serve as the “principal determinant of the 
scope of the monopoly.”
123
  Claim breadth was kept in check by the U.K.’s “fair 
basis” doctrine, which reigned in claims by invalidating those that were not 
“fairly based” on the specification.
124
   
Patent applications arising under the 1949 U.K. Patents Act were governed by 
section 4(3)(b) of the Act which states: “Every complete specification . . . shall 
disclose the best method of performing the invention which is known to the 
applicant and for which he is entitled to claim protection . . . .”
125
  Section 
4(3)(b)is analogous to the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and serves a similar 
role in statutory patentability.
126
  The U.K. implemented the best mode in 
                                                                                                                                     
117
 See id at 52–59.  
118
 See id.  
119
 Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 87, § 32 (U.K.).   
120
 Irah H. Donner, Book Review, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 565 (1993-94) 
(reviewing BRIAN C. REID, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PATENT LAW (1993)).  
121
 See WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLETCUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, 
COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 229–30 (5th ed. 2003).   
122
 See id. at 167 (“What British Courts have insisted on is that the claims are there to mark out 
the monopolised territory . . . . If they clearly do mean one thing, arguments that they nevertheless 
mean something else will be rejected.”).  The authors quote Lord Russell as saying that “no canon 
or principle which will justify one in departing from the unambiguous and grammatical meaning 
of a claim . . . .”  Id. (quoting EMI v. Lissen (1939) 56 R.P.C. 23 at 40–41). 
123
  Id.  
124
 See Patents Act, 1949, § 32(1)(i).  
125
 Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 87, § 4(3)(b) (U.K.).  The full text of section 4(3) 
is: 
(3) Every Complete Specification— 
(a) shall particularly describe the invention and the method by which it is to be 
performed; 
b) shall disclose the best method of performing the invention which is known to 
the applicant and for which he is entitled to claim protection; and 
c) shall end with a claim or claims defining the scope of the invention claimed. 
Id. 
126
 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2011).  
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infringement suits via section 32(1)(h), which was analogous to 35 U.S.C. § 
282(3).  Section 32(1)(h) allowed best mode to be asserted as an affirmative 
defense by stating that:  
Subject to the provisions of this Act, a patent may, on the 
petition of any person interested, be revoked by the court on any of 
the following grounds, that is to say, . . . that the complete 
specification does not sufficiently and fairly describe the invention 
and the method by which it is to be performed, or does not disclose 
the best method of performing it which was known to the applicant 




This section lays out not only best mode’s role as an affirmative defense and 
revocation tool but also highlights the “sufficiency” and “fair basis” disclosure 
requirements that U.K. courts often rely on to invalidate patents.  The sufficient 
disclosure—containing utility and best mode—along with the fair basis doctrine 
worked together to help keep the U.K. patent system running like a well-oiled 
machine.  Unfortunately, the wheels came off in 1977, along with the best mode 
and fair basis doctrines. 
B. Patent Reform Act of 1977 
In an effort to harmonize with other European nations, the British drastically 
altered the regulations governing their patent system.  The 1949 Patents Act 
awarded patent rights when patents contained three fundamentals: a claim in the 
specification that defined the subject matter scope of property in the invention, a 
description in the specification that provided sufficient disclosure of that 
invention, and a claim that was fairly based on the invention.
128
  In replacing the 
1949 Act with the 1977 Act, the British removed best mode from the sufficiency 
requirement and eliminated fair basis as a U.K. disclosure requirement.
 129
  
The 1977 Patents Act replaces the language of 32(1)(h) with a new provision, 
section 72(1)(c), eliminating best mode’s and fair basis doctrine’s use as 
revocation tools:  
                                                                                                                                     
127
 Patents Act, 1949 § 32 (emphasis added). The case most often cited as an example of 
section 32(1)(h) is American Cyanamid Co. v. Berk Pharmaceuticals, in which  a patent was 
revoked for failure to state the “best method” (used interchangeably with “best mode” in the U.K.) 
because the applicant disclosed the option known not to produce the best results.  Am. Cyanid Co. 
v. Berk Pharm., [1976] R.P.C. 231. 
128
 David J Brennan, Biogen Sufficiency Reconsidered, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 476, 479 (2009).  
129
 Patents Act, 1977, c. 37 (U.K.).  The 1977 Act was based on the EPC, so removal of the 
best mode requirement was essentially a direct result of the desire to harmonize with other 
European countries.  
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Subject to the following provisions of this Act, the court or the 
comptroller may on application of any person by order revoke a 
patent for an invention on (but only on) any of the following 
grounds, that is to say . . . the specification of the patent does not 
disclose the invention clearly enough and completely enough for it 
to be performed by a person skilled in the art . . . .”
130
  
This section codified a new “sufficiency” requirement which relies on a 
specification that discloses the invention “clearly and completely enough for it to 
be performed by a person skilled in the art.”
131
  This new “enabling disclosure” 
fulfills the “consideration” for the patent grant.
132
   
Also, the 1977 Patents Act chose to eliminate rather than amend section 32(i), 
which contained the “fair basis” doctrine, of the 1949 Act.
133
  This eliminated any 
role for the “fair basis” doctrine in the U.K. patent system.  Fair basis is absent 
from the EPC, which is why the U.K. eliminated the doctrine.     
C. Post-Reform Adjudication 
It turns out that the U.K. courts are dealing with a separate albeit similar 
problem that the U.S. courts will soon face.  The U.K. courts are having trouble 
reconciling the loss of multiple disclosure requirements as a means of revocation 
in the context of their peripheral claim interpretation regime.  Essentially, the 
1977 act required that patent rights be “supported by” the disclosure, but the 
                                                                                                                                     
130
 Id. § 72 (emphasis added).  Termed the “sufficiency” clause, which had the power to serve 
as grounds for revocation. See id.    
131
 Id. §§ 14(3), 72(1)(c); Helitune Ltd. v. Stewart Hughes Ltd., [1991] F.S.R. 171, 201 (Eng.) 
(noting that section 72(1)(c) of the 1977 Act promulgates the sufficiency doctrine from 32(1)(h) of 
the 1949 Act); CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 121, at 225.  The test to determine whether or 
not the disclosure was sufficient was: “[W]hether a man skilled in the art can . . . rectify the 
mistakes and supply the omissions with[out] the exercise of any inventive faculty?  If he can, then 
the description of the specification is sufficient.”  Mentor Corp. v. Hollister Inc. [1993] R.P.C. 7, 
14 (quoting Valensi v. British Radio Corp. [1973] R.P.C. 337) (stating that it depends on the 
nature of the invention)).  
132
 CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 121, at 225.  
133
 Whether or not these disclosure requirements were truly disposed of is a question that one 
commentator thinks is worth asking.  Leung argues that the Patents Act of 1977 codified the 
sufficiency doctrine by stating that “[t]he court . . . may . . . revoke a patent [on the ground that] 
the specification of the patent does not disclose the invention clearly enough and completely 
enough for it to be performed by a person skilled in the art.”  Tim Leung, Generics (UK) Ltd v. H 
Lundbeck A/S: In Search of Optimal Patent Protection: Biogen Insufficiency and the Chequered 
History of Product Claims, 32(4) E.I.P.R. 165, 169 (2010) (footnote omitted). 
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British had no mechanism with which to enforce it since fair basis and best mode 
were removed as grounds for invalidity.
134
   
As expected, in the absence of a best mode requirement, the definition of an 
“enabling disclosure” requirement changed.  In Molnlycke AB v. Proctor & 
Gamble Ltd., the enabling disclosure (and its satisfaction of the sufficiency 
requirement) was interpreted to mean that 72(1)(c) “does not set a standard 
whereby the man skilled in the art must be able to make all possible 
embodiments.  But he must be able to make an embodiment using the information 
disclosed in the specification . . . .”
135
  Thus, when a patentee need only disclose 
“his ‘next but one’ best method, whilst keeping the best method itself as a trade 
secret,” the patent grant (scope of the monopoly) is not at all commensurate with 
the disclosure.
136
  As a result of the 1977 Patents Act, the U.K. had no way of 
policing hidden best mode fact patterns that awarded overly broad patent rights 
(although best mode can be argued under a fair basis / Biogen Sufficiency 
apparatus).  
Another case that highlighted the U.K. courts struggle with the new disclosure 
requirement also flew in the face of U.K. patent law principles.  Genentech v. 
Wellcome Foundation,
137
 involved one of the first cases to address overly broad 
patent rights without the “fair basis” doctrine.  The court held that the proper 
scope of claims was not a matter that could be raised after issue of the patent.
138
  
Without use of the “fair basis” mechanism’s ability to object to claim scope post-
issuance of patent rights, there was no way to check to see if the overly broad 
patents rights were commensurate with the scope of the monopoly.  This resulted 
                                                                                                                                     
134
 David Brennan used a speech by Robin Jacob, from his 1993 Herchel Smith Lecture, where 
he said:  
[T]he law of insufficiency is now being called on to cover more. The trouble is 
that the framers of the EPC behaved very oddly: they required the EPO and 
consequently via the 1977 Act, the UK Office, to refuse grant of a patent for an 
invention which was not, in the metaphorical language of the Treaty and Act, 
‘supported by’ the disclosure. But such lack of support -- which we used to call 
lack of fair basis -- is not a ground of invalidity. Why it should be all right if one 
could get the claim past the Patent Office when it was looking other way, but not 
otherwise, beats me. 
Brennan, supra note 128, at 480 (quoting Robin Jacob, The Herchel Smith Lecture 1993, 
[1993] E.I.P.R. 312, 314–315).  This summarizes the idea of a free beer claim—no 
mechanism with which to regulate over broad claiming.  
135
 [1992] F.S.R. 549, [1994] R.P.C. 94 (emphasis added).  See also Genentech Inc’s (Human 
Growth Hormone) Patent, [1989] R.P.C. 613; Quantel v. Spaceward Microsystems Ltd., [1990] 
R.P.C. 147.   
136
 See REID, supra note 116, at 55.  
137
 [1989] R.P.C. 147.  
138
 CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 121, at 230.  
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in a windfall for the patentee and violated a core principle of the patent system.  
Again, the U.K. patent system watched helplessly.  
D. Resurrection of 1949 Sufficiency 
At least one Judge in the House of Lords did not like how the recent line of 
cases did not align with U.K. patent law principles.  In Biogen Inc v. Medeva Plc, 
the courts laid out how to deal with cases where the lack of support from the 
specification leads to overly broad patent rights.
139
  The court sought to address 
the issue of overly broad claims not being supported by the specification, but 
ended up arguing for a “sufficiency” disclosure requirement to combat overly 
broad claiming.   
Lord Hoffman stated that in his view section 72(1)(c) of the 1977 Patents Act 
intended to ensure that grounds for invalidity included cases where “the extent of 
the monopoly claimed exceeds the technical contribution to the art made by the 
invention as described in the specification.”
140
  Lord Hoffman noted that under 
the 1949 Act, “fair basis” doctrine provided a means to invalidate these types of 
claims.  He argued that the “fair basis” doctrine never went away and was readily 
applicable in Biogen and therefore invalidated the claims that were not supported 
by the specification.
141
  Lord Hoffman argued that the fair basis doctrine existed 
within EPC 83 and 84—which had equivalents in the Patents Act of 1977 in 14(3) 
and (5).
142
  Section 72 of the Act included the language of 14(3), but not 14(5).
143
  
                                                                                                                                     
139
 38 B.M.L.R. 149, [1997] R.P.C. 1.  Biogen does not address best mode, but rather it 
signifies the struggle that U.K. courts had with the Patents Act of 1977. Biogen sought a patent on 
an artificially created molecule of DNA that when introduced into a host cell will make antigens of 
the virus hepatitis B.  Id. ¶ 9.  Because Biogen was one of the first biotechnology patent cases 
adjudicated in the U.K. courts, a line of reasoning existed that the scope should be limited in order 
to avoid stifling innovation in an infant industry.  Id. ¶ 75.  
140
 Id. ¶ 80.  
141
 Id.  
142
 Lord Hoffman stated:  
But the disappearance of "lack of fair basis" as an express ground for 
revocation does not in my view mean that general principle which it expressed 
has been abandoned. The jurisprudence of the EPO shows that it is still in full 
vigour and embodied in articles 83 and 84 of the EPC, of which the equivalents 
in the 1977 Act are section 14(3) and (5) and section 72(l)(c).  
Id. ¶ 80.  The 1977 Act rearranged the statute’s specification requirements—previously under their 
own separate heading in the 1949 Act—which are now grouped in with the section “Making of 
Application.”   Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 14 (U.K.).  Section 14(3) states “[t]he specification of 
an application shall disclose the invention in a manner which is clear enough and complete enough 
for the invention to be performed by a person skilled in the art.”  Id.    Section 14(5) states “[t]he 
claim or claims shall—(a) define the matter for which the applicant seeks protection; (b) be clear 
and concise;  (c) be supported by the description; and (d) relate to one invention or to a group of 
inventions which are so linked as to form a single inventive concept.”  Id.   
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Thus, Biogen held that the sufficiency doctrine of section 72(1)(c) (clearly enough 
and completely enough) included a “fair basis” claim analysis, and that 
specification sufficiency should be evaluated using both doctrines (called Biogen 
Sufficiency).  
This case ended up being quite controversial, because the “fair basis” doctrine 
was itself controversial,
144
 and critics believed that this brought U.K. law on 
sufficiency (disclosure) and scope of claim out of step with the European Patent 
Office (“EPO”).
145
  This view is short sighted; all Lord Hoffman advocated for 
was the application of pseudo-central claim interpretation, but unfortunately chose 
to frame the argument in terms of fair basis doctrine.  An analysis based on 
central claim interpretation would have put the United Kingdom in line with the 
central claim interpretation regime of the EPO.  Further, Lord Hoffman was 
progressive in the sense that he created a mechanism for adjudicating hidden best 
mode fact patterns.  When a hidden best mode fact pattern arises and there is no 
mechanism with which to strike it down, the sufficiency doctrine, which includes 
the fair basis doctrine, gives the United Kingdom the best chance of doing so.
146
 
In H Lundbeck A/S v. Generics (UK) Ltd,
147
 the court reacted to the Biogen 
Sufficiency doctrine and sought to bring U.K. patent law back in line with the 
European patent office.  The court argued that Lord Hoffman’s reasoning that a 
patentee’s monopoly should always be restricted to the patentee’s contribution to 
the art was not based on any principle in U.K. patent law.
148
  Essentially, the court 
argues that sufficiency should not be used to “correct” a patent that claims a 
                                                                                                             
143
 See H Lundbeck A/S v. Generics (UK) Ltd, [2009] UKHL 12, 15. 
144
 Tim Leung notes:  
These issues were compounded by the apparent conflation of the two quite 
different reasons
 
why the fair basing test was introduced in the 1949 Act: the 
problem of undue claim width in a complete specification, and the issue of 
disconformity between a provisional and complete specification in the context of 
priority dates.
 
As such, it has been argued that the introduction of fair basing, 
was the vehicle by which the clarity of earlier law was lost.  
Leung, supra note 133, at 169. 
145
 Rowan Freeland & Galya Blachman, The Law of Sufficiency: Is Biogen Still Good Law?, 
31(9) E.I.P.R. 478, 478–483 (2009). The EPO did not allow invalidation based on the fair basis 
doctrine.  
146
 Fair basis awards patent rights only to those claims that are supported in the specification; 
thus, no best mode, no patent right, and no protection in an infringement case.  See Biogen Inc v. 
Medeva Plc, 38 B.M.L.R. 149, [1997] R.P.C. 1, ¶ 80.   
147
 [2009] UKHL 12.  The court addressed the validity of a patent awarded to Lundbeck 
relating to escitalopram (an anti-depressant).  
148
 Remco E.P. De Ranitz & Otto P. Swens, UK Patent Law Crosses the Channel, 30 E.I.P.R. 
389, 391 (2008) (noting that the Patents Act of 1977 got rid of the “fair basis” doctrine).  
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product and a way of making the product.
149
  Rather, the court argues that an 
invention is “sufficiently enabled if the specification and common general 
knowledge enable the skilled person to make it.”
150
 
Lundbeck does bring the U.K. patent system more in line with the EPO in 
regard to sufficiency because the EPO does not recognize the fair basis 
doctrine.
151
  However, it is important to note that in post reform adjudication, best 
mode invalidation is likely to find a home in sufficiency doctrine whatever its 
current form.
152
  This is the case because pre-reform best mode was adjudicated as 
an element of the sufficiency doctrine.   
V. ANALYSIS: HANDLING OF FUTURE “HIDDEN BEST MODE” CASES  
There are fundamental differences between the U.K. and the U.S. situations.  
First, in the U.K., the 1977 Act eliminated the best mode disclosure requirement 
but left the patent system with a sufficiency doctrine that could serve much the 
same purpose.
153
  Furthermore, although a subsequent U.K. court has 
distinguished Biogen, the Biogen Sufficiency doctrine provides an umbrella for 
which to argue best mode violations.
154
  The AIA does not put in place an 
invalidity mechanism that is similar to the one it takes away.  It could be some 
time before a court hears a case involving a hidden best mode fact pattern under 
the new law.  What options do courts have when a hidden best mode fact pattern 
finally makes it in front of the court?
155
  
                                                                                                                                     
149
 Id.  
150
 See Freeland & Blachman, supra note 145, at 482.   
151
 Id.  The EPO does not have to recognize the fair basis doctrine because of its central claim 
interpretation regime works in place of the doctrine.  
152
 CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 121, at 229.  Pre-reform best mode was adjudicated as 
an element of the sufficiency doctrine.  Thus, when a hidden best mode fact pattern arises and 
there is no mechanism with which to strike it down, the sufficiency doctrine that includes the fair 
basis doctrine gives the United Kingdom the best chance of doing so.  
153
 The Patents Act of 1977 did not remove all of the tools under which a best mode case may 
be adjudicated as evidenced by the Biogen decision.  See infra Part V.C.   
154
 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.  
155
 One solution in particular would have allowed an infringer to challenge the priority of the 
initial application by claiming that a missing best mode meant that the disclosure was not 
complete and therefore there was no priority date.  Unfortunately for future infringers, the drafters 
of AIA thought of that first and included in the amended statute: “CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—
Sections 119(e)(1) and 120 of title 35, United States Code, are each amended by striking ‘the first 
paragraph of section 112 of this title’ and inserting ‘section112(a) (other than the requirement to 
disclose the best mode)’.”  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 
328 (2011).  
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A. English Influence  
An analysis of the U.K. best mode enforcement landscape revealed two 
disparate alternatives: strict adherence to the new disclosure requirements,
156
 or a 
loose statutory construction of the disclosure requirements in favor of 
invalidation.
157
  It is apparent that following the former alternative, essentially 
following AIA as is, is not a viable option because it violates the principles upon 
which the U.S. patent system was founded.  The latter alternative, as explained 
earlier, is a viable option because Lord Hoffman was really advocating for a 
central claim interpretation regime under the guise of a “fair basis” rationale.   
B. Move Towards a Central Claim Interpretation Regime  
Elimination of the best mode requirement as an affirmative defense creates a 
situation where there may be no means to invalidate a patent that generally 
enables but does not disclose the best mode.  This problem is created, in part, by 
the fact that the U.S. patent system is a peripheral claim interpretation system.
158
  
By switching to a central claim interpretation system, the U.S. patent system 
would establish a mechanism with which to go after hidden best mode claims.  
Patent rights would be granted only to what is disclosed in the specification.
159
  
Thus, no disclosure of best mode means protection against infringers who practice 
it.   
Lord Hoffman viewed central claiming as a means to make up for a weakened 
disclosure requirement post-1977 reform.
160
  The adoption of the 1977 Act 
introduced language in section 14(5) that required the claim to be supported by 
the description, which drawn from the EPC was meant to resemble a central claim 
interpretation.
161
  Lord Hoffman articulated this stance in Biogen stating “that the 
specification must enable the invention to be performed to the full extent of the 
monopoly claimed.”
162
 If the invention discloses a principle capable of general 
application, the claims may be in correspondingly general terms.”
163
   
                                                                                                                                     
156
 H Lundbeck A/S v. Generics (UK) Ltd, [2009] UKHL 12 (producing a result inconsistent 
with principles of patent system).  
157
 Biogen, Inc v. Medeva, Plc, 38 B.M.L.R. 149, [1997] R.P.C. 1.   
158
 See 1 MOY, supra note 3, § 4.1. 
159
 See Biogen, [1997] RPC 1, ¶ 80; Lundbeck, [2009] UKHL 12, ¶ 47.  Lord Hoffman 
incorporated reasoning into his Biogen opinion that is indicative of a central claim interpretation 
regime.  Id. ¶ 80.  In not particularly good form, Lord Hoffman addressed the revival of the fair 
basis doctrine.  Id.  This ignited a flurry of criticism and is one of the reasons that Biogen is so 
famous.  See Freeland & Blachman, supra note 145, at 478–83.  
160
 See Biogen, [1997] RPC 1, ¶ 80.   
161
 See Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 14(5) (U.K.).  
162
 See Biogen, [1997] RPC 1, ¶ 63.  
163
 Id.  
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The CAFC instituted a similar push towards central claim interpretation in the 
late 1990’s.
164
  The decisions set out to encourage explicit disclosure in the 
specification of all embodiments so that claims would be supported and not risk 
invalidation.
165
  When deciding future hidden best mode fact patterns, future 
courts can rely on this string of cases to provide a foundation upon which to 
establish a central claim interpretation regime.  This will provide both a 
mechanism to police patents that slip through the patent act filter, as well as 
acting as a deterrent to future patentees to disclose the best mode or face a narrow 
reading of their claim.  
C. Strengthen Enforcement of Section 112 Paragraph 1: Require Updating  
The best mode requirement neither requires that the best mode be designated 
nor updated.
166
  As the USPTO solicits comments on the new law, there is sure to 
be clamoring for an amendment that requires a patentee to declare the best mode 
and to update the best mode during prosecution.
167
  A downside to this approach 
is that any update to the best mode that is “adding a specific mode of practicing 
the invention not described in the application as filed” is considered a new matter 
and is barred by § 132 of the Patent Act.
168
  However, strengthening the role of § 
112 in patentability will encourage innovation by increasing the likelihood of 
follow-on inventions.
169
  The best use of a stronger § 112 would be in conjunction 
with the inequitable conduct doctrine.  
D. Inequitable Conduct Invalidity in Place of Best Mode  
The inequitable conduct doctrine alone is not enough to enforce patents that 
fail to disclose best mode.
170
  Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco 
                                                                                                                                     
164
 David C. Radulescu, The Federal Circuit’s Narrowing of the Literal Scope of Patent Claims 
by Focussing on Embodiments Disclosed in the Specification, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 539 (2000).  Radulescu uses the discussion of four “broad claim construction” opinions to 
highlight what appeared to be a push by the Federal Circuit requiring patentees to broadly describe 
the invention in the body of the patent as well as in the claims. 
165
 See id.  
166
 See supra notes 53, 54, and accompanying text. 
167
 See Markham, supra note 52, at 156.  Anti-best mode proponents argue that requiring both 
declaration and updating would go a long way to strengthening the best mode requirement.   
168
 See MPEP, supra note 36, § 2165.01(V). 
169
 See FTC IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 109, at 1 (stating that adequate public notice via 
disclosure requirements provide future inventors with all tools necessary to “follow on.”).   
170
 See Field Hybrids v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 03-4121 ADM/JSM, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1159, at *36 (D. Minn. Jan. 37, 2005) (finding plaintiff's patents invalid for a best mode violation 
even though defendant offered no evidence of specific intent to deceive). 
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 lays out the relationship between best mode and inequitable 
conduct:  
Because disclosure of the best mode is statutorily required, see 35 
U.S.C. § 112, failure to disclose that best mode is inherently 
material and, we believe, reaches the minimum level of materiality 
necessary for a finding of inequitable conduct.  On the other hand, 
since the failure to disclose the best mode is not excused even if 
unintentional, but inequitable conduct requires a ‘threshold’ level 
of intent, the failure to disclose the best mode will not constitute 
inequitable conduct in every case.
172
   
However, the Federal Circuit recently tightened the standard for finding 
inequitable conduct in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton-Dickinson & Co..
173
 An 
applicant must now meet the clear and convincing evidence standard by 
specifically intending to deceive the USPTO.
174
  Under the AIA, where there is no 
intent to deceive and no best mode requirement, the patent is likely to slip through 
the patent act filter.  This is where a stronger § 112 comes into play.  Failure to 
declare or update the best mode
175
 would satisfy, upon proof by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the applicant intended to deceive the USPTO thereby 
establishing grounds for a finding of inequitable conduct making the patent 
unenforceable.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Elimination of the best mode requirement sends a message that adequate 
disclosure really is only an ancillary purpose of the patent system; incentive to 
invent and commercialization are the sole purposes and adequate disclosure is 
                                                                                                                                     
171
 910 F.2d 804, 808 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In order to show inequitable conduct the moving party 
must meet a clear and convincing evidence of a threshold degree of materiality of the nondisclosed 
information.  J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  The high 
standard reduces the doctrine’s usefulness as an alternative to best mode.  
172
 Consolidated, 910 F.2d at 808 (citations omitted).  See also Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 
52 F.3d 1043, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  The court held that Novopharm did not have a case of 
inequitable conduct because it failed to carry its burden of proving an intent to deceive by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
173
 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (2011) (en banc) (“This court now tightens the standards for finding 
both intent and materiality in order to redirect a doctrine that has been overused to the detriment of 
the public.”).    
174
 See id.  See Zhe Peng et al., A Panacea for Inequitable Conduct Problems or Kingsdown 
Version 2.0? The Therasense Decision and a Look Into the Future of U.S. Patent Law Reform, 16 
VA. J.L. & TECH. 373 (2011), for a discussion on inequitable conduct before and after Therasense.   
175
 See supra note 167 and accompanying test.  
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only an impediment towards achieving these goals.
176
  Simple steps are all that is 
needed to bring disclosure back to the forefront of the quid pro quo exchange.  
Short of re-instituting best mode as an affirmative defense, the most appropriate 
solutions are to either shift towards a central claim interpretation regime or couple 
a strengthened § 112-best mode with the inequitable conduct doctrine. 
                                                                                                                                     
176
 See Devlin, supra note 16, at 406 (arguing that society is better off with a patent system 
where incentive to invent and commercialization are the primary rationales and where adequate 
disclosure can be a hindrance in pursuit of invention and commercialization).  
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